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We develop a simple model of fiscal competition among ageing municipalities. When ageing 
advances, gerontocracies and social planners gradually substitute publicly provided goods 
aimed at the mobile young population for publicly provided goods for the elderly. This 
substitution process does not only depend on the ageing itself but also on crowding effects 
and on the regional distribution of the elderly population. We show that fiscal competition 
prevents the exploitation of the young. When the share of the elderly is sufficiently large, the 
utility of the young is even higher in gerontocracies than in welfare maximizing societies. 
Due to fiscal competition, the gerontocracies will provide even more of the publicly provided 
good for the young than the social planner. 
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Low birth rates and increased longevity lead to population ageing in many devel-
oped countries. This demographic transition will have wide-reaching political,
economic and social consequences. Economics literature has so far mostly dis-
cussed the macroeconomic impact of ageing societies. This paper focuses on the
local level and asks how demographic change will aﬀect the provision of pub-
licly provided goods. On the one hand, as the median voter’s age increases the
provision of publicly provided goods may shift toward those goods appreciated
mostly by the elderly population. On the other hand, the competition among
municipalities for the young and mobile intensiﬁes, thus forcing the municipal-
ities to provide more of those goods that make the location attractive for the
younger population. In a model of ﬁscal competition among gerontocratic mu-
nicipalities, we demonstrate that goods for the elderly are excessively provided
in the early phase of a gerontocratic regime. However, when the share of the
old population becomes suﬃciently large, the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition domi-
nates and an ineﬃciently high amount of publicly provided goods for the young
population is supplied.
Demographic change will lead to a signiﬁcant decrease of the population size
in many European economies. According to UN projections [United Nations
(2007)], the countries in central and eastern Europe will experience the most
rapid population loss. Bulgaria and Ukraine are the forerunners in this process
and will have lost around 2.4 percent of their 2005 populations by the year
2020.1 At the same time, the median age in these two countries will increase
from 40.8 to 44.6 years and from 38.9 to 41.9 years respectively. In southern
and western Europe, the more signiﬁcant demographic process will be ageing.
Germany’s population, will only shrink by 0.12 percent by 2020. However the
median age is projected to increase by as much as 5.2 years from 42.1 years
in 2005 to 47.3 years in 2020. Then only Italy is projected to have an even
older population with a median age of 47.5 years. These shifts in the size and
age structure can have signiﬁcant consequences for the economy as a whole. In
particular, the impact on capital markets [e.g., Abel (2001), Boersch-Supan et al.
(2002), Krueger and Ludwig (2007), Poterba (2001, 2004)] and on public pension
schemes [e.g. Breyer and Stolte (2001), Casamatta et al. (2001), Demange and
Laroque (1999), Fehr (2000), Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002)] has been extensively
studied.2 The focus on the aggregate demography often hides that even more
pronounced demographic changes occur on the regional or local level.
The changing size and composition of the population poses many challenges
for local policymakers. Downsizing of the infrastructure is needed in order to
1All values pertain to the medium variant of the 2006 revision of the World Population
Prospects Database by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social
Aﬀairs of the United Nations Secretariat, accessible at: http://esa.un.org/unpp.
2Breyer and Stolte (2001) and Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002) take a political economy point
of view on public pension reforms. Similar to our paper, Sinn and Uebelmesser (2002) consider
the power of the old in a gerontocratic society. According to their calculations, Germany will
be a gerontocracy in 2016 as pension reforms beneﬁting the younger cohorts will then become
politically unfeasible.
1maintain ﬁscal balances. The portfolio of publicly provided goods has to be ad-
justed while taking into account the changing age structure. While the younger
population may mostly desire access to jobs, schools or child care facilities, the
elderly may prefer aﬀordable public transport or safe neighborhoods. The neces-
sary adjustments in the public budget may create conﬂicts between generations.
As the median age increases, majority voting outcomes may shift to beneﬁt the
elderly population at the cost of the younger generations. Such generational
conﬂicts in local service provision have been addressed in other contributions,
in particular with respect to the provision of public education [e.g. Poterba
(1998) for the US and Grob and Wolter (2005) for Switzerland]. On the inter-
national level, a gerontocracy may strategically invest in public goods for the
young generation, if the elderly beneﬁt from higher future productivity, e.g.,
via taxes or public pension schemes. Konrad (1995) shows that gerontocracies
have an excessive incentive to invest in immobile infrastructure as opposed to
mobile human capital. Our model also contains a strategic investment motive
on a subnational level. Haupt and Peters (2003) consider an overlapping gener-
ations model in which the contribution rates to public pension schemes lead to
interregional competition. When the young can strategically migrate, their ex-
ploitation by the gerontocracy is limited. The exit option of migration also plays
a crucial role in our model. Finally, the studies by Borge and Rattsø (1995) and
Borge and Rattsø (2008) are closely related to our paper. They mainly focus
on local services, such as child care and elderly care, and analyze the negative
eﬀect of ageing on the per capita spending on services for the younger cohorts.
In contrast to our paper, the inﬂuence of local interaction and ﬁscal competition
plays no role.
This contribution examines the eﬀects ageing has on the provision of pub-
licly provided goods at the local level. The young population segments are
disadvantaged once the elderly gain the majority, as a gerontocracy will provide
less of the impure public goods for the young than would be the case under
welfare maximization. However, when ageing proceeds and the elderly have a
strong majority, the young will actually receive more than under welfare max-
imization. This seemingly counterintuitive result appears as ﬁscal competition
for the young intensiﬁes. The local budget depends on the population size, as
municipalities are often ﬁnanced to a large extent through per capita grants. To
attract young families, even gerontocratic municipalities are forced to publicly
provide goods for younger cohorts. When ageing proceeds, ﬁscal competition
becomes so intensive that the level of the publicly provided goods for the young
even exceeds the welfare maximizing level.
We also show that the initial distribution of the population eﬀects the out-
come. The paradoxical case where the gerontocracies provide too much of the
publicly provided good for the young is more likely when the elderly population
is more unequally distributed across municipalities. Regions with large dispar-
ities in their age structures may experience a more intensive ﬁscal competition
for the young.
Section 2 describes the setup of the model. In Section 3, we discuss the
equilibrium outcomes for gerontocracies that face ﬁscal competition. Section
24 derives the social planner’s solution. In Section 5, the outcomes from the
previous sections are contrasted with one another and the eﬀects of further
ageing and changes in the distribution of the elderly are considered. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a region with two municipalities. The population of this region con-
sists of both young and old individuals. The fundamental diﬀerence between
the two population groups is that the young are able to choose the municipality
in which they reside, whereas the old segment of the population is immobile.3
Each municipality supplies two congestible public goods, one for each population
segment. The funding for the publicly provided goods is achieved exclusively
through per capita grants. When the population increases, a municipality re-
ceives more resources for ﬁnancing its services. However, when there are more
users the individual beneﬁt from the publicly provided good is reduced due
to crowding eﬀects. Since the young are mobile between municipalities, their
utility maximizing behavior places the municipalities in competition with one
another.
2.1 Municipal Budgets
There is a ﬁxed total young population, N, and each young person must live in
one of the two municipalities. Therefore, each municipality has a young popu-
lation Ni where i = 1;2 stand for the respective municipality and accordingly
N = N1 + N2. Additionally each municipality also has a number of elderly
individuals Mi where i = 1;2.
The size of the publicly provided goods for the young and the old are denoted
by Yi and Xi, respectively. The prices of the two goods are normalized to unity.
These publicly provided goods have to be ﬁnanced in each municipality by
a transfer from an upper level of government. The municipality receives a per
capita block grant of b.4 The municipal budget constraint thus has the following
form:
b(Ni + Mi) = Yi + Xi; where i = 1;2: (1)
The assumption of per capita grants captures a stylized fact of many munici-
pal ﬁnancing schemes in continental Europe. Even when there is some degree of
tax autonomy, revenue sharing and equalization schemes make the local budgets
de facto dependent on the population size [OECD (2005)]. Transfers and grants
3Empirically the most mobile age groups are the 20-35 year-olds. Whereas the older cohorts
may not be completely immobile, their mobility is almost insigniﬁcant compared to that of
the young.
4The results of the model do not depend on the simplifying assumption of a single source
of ﬁnance. The per capita grant only has to be the marginal source of ﬁnance.
3are intended to achieve horizontal equity in per capita revenue even when tax
base disparities exist.
2.2 Age Group Speciﬁc Preferences
In each municipality, the utility of a young individual depends on the amount of
publicly provided goods (Yi) and on the size of the population in this age group







i = 1;2: (2)
where  2 (0;1) ensures declining marginal utility. The parameter  2 [0;1]
determines the degree of congestion. In the extreme cases when  = 0 and
 = 1, the publicly provided good has the characteristic of a pure public good
or a private good, respectively. The intermediate cases, 0 <  < 1, capture the
empirically relevant phenomenon of partial crowding for many publicly provided
goods (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972).5 For
simplicity, we exclude spillover eﬀects between the two municipalities, i.e. the
utility from locating in municipality i is independent of the level of provision in
municipality j.








i = 1;2 (3)
For simplicity, we assume identical parameters  and  for the young and the
old.6
2.3 Location Choice
Fiscal competition takes place over the bundle of publicly provided goods oﬀered
in each of the two municipalities. The municipalities set their levels of publicly
provided goods knowing that young individuals can move to the municipality
oﬀering the better bundle for the young. For simplicity, we assume costless
mobility. Since the relocation decision is intraregional in our case, the costs
(both monetary and emotional) associated with mobility should be relatively
low. The congestion of the public good will reduce the beneﬁts from the publicly
5Edwards (1990) discusses the virtues of alternative crowding speciﬁcations and ﬁnds that
this simple decreasing marginal returns speciﬁcation fares fairly well. Refer to Reiter and
Weichenrieder (1997) for a survey of demand estimates of local public goods as well as a
discussion of the measurement of crowding.
6By construction, the model does not only represent the potential conﬂict of interest arising
between young and old. Instead the framework may also be interpreted in terms of any two
groups that demand diﬀerent publicly provided goods and diﬀer in terms of mobility (e.g.,
families with children and single households).
4provided good as more young move in.7 The migration equilibrium is achieved,
when a young person is just indiﬀerent between the two municipalities:
U1(N1;Y1) = U2(N2;Y2): (4)
It can easily be veriﬁed that the migration equilibrium is stable. Using











with i 6= j. The equilibrium population in municipality i is only dependent on
the provision levels for the young in each municipality, as well as on the total
population of young.
3 Gerontocracies
When the elderly are in the majority and have have full authority over the al-
location decision, a municipality will be considered a gerontocracy. The elderly
choose the utility maximizing level of the publicly provided good. Full exploita-
tion of the young generation is prevented by the mobility of the young. Each
gerontocracy tries to provide a suﬃcient level of publicly provided goods for the
young to remain competitive and to generate a suﬃciently large budget. Hence,




Xi = b  (Mi + NE
i (Yi))   Yi: (6)
The municipality receives b per inhabitant. The size of the young population
depends on the amount of the publicly provided good Yi [see Eq. (5)]. To obtain
the budget available for the publicly provided good of the elderly, the expendi-
ture for the young Yi is subtracted from the total budget. From the perspective
of a single gerontocracy, the optimal provision of the publicly provided good for




















  1 = 0: (7)
For  > 1
2, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium8 with
7We focus on the provision of publicly provided goods as the sole determinants of location
choices. In addition (or alternatively), production may be added to the model. Decreasing
marginal productivities limit the inﬂow of workers and also generate an interior migration
equilibrium.
8For   1=2, no pure strategy equilibrium exists. The details of the derivation and the
properties of the mixed strategy equilibrium can be found in Appendix A.
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The provision for the young in either municipality does not depend on the share
of elderly, but only on the total number of young across both municipalities.
Fiscal competition forces the gerontocratic municipalities to spend more on
the young population when the per capita transfer b is high, when the young
population N is large and when the crowding eﬀects are low (low ). Using the
budget constraint, the equilibrium level of the publicly provided good for the














2 <  < 1, the public provision of the good for the elderly does not only
increase in the size of the old population Mi but also in the size of young
population N as the gerontocracy diverts some resources from the young.
To analyze the impact of ageing on the provision of publicly provided goods,
we normalize the size of the total population to unity: N + M = 1. The share
of the elderly in the total population is then deﬁned as s  M
1 . For notational
convenience, we furthermore introduce mi as the share of the elderly population
living in municipality i: mi  Mi
Mi+Mj. These deﬁnitions allow us to write the



























Taking the derivatives of equations (10) and (11) with respect to s yields
information on whether the young and the old gain or lose from an ageing
society. The utility of the young clearly declines when the share of the elderly

































The impact of ageing on the utility of the elderly depends on the expression
inside the curly brackets.
6Figure 1: The Impact of Ageing on the Elderly in a Gerontocracy
Proposition 1. In gerontocratic municipalities that face ﬁscal competition,
ageing decreases (increases) the utility of the elderly population if the degree of
crowding exceeds (remains below) a critical level  .
Proof. The impact of ageing on the utility of the elderly depends on the


















2 > 0.  = 1 yields z(1) =  1
4. As z is strictly declining in 
( @z
@ =  smi   s
42   1 s




@s R 0 ,  Q  .
The outcome is illustrated in Figure 1. We measure the share of the elderly
s on the horizontal axis and the degree of crowding  on the vertical axis. sG
denotes the minimum share of the elderly in society as a whole, necessary to
make municipality i a gerontocracy (s  mi  1
2(1   s) ) s  sG = 1
2mi+1). In
a gerontocratic municipality, the gains or losses of the elderly depend on both
their share (s) and the characteristics of the publicly provided good (). The
elderly lose from an ageing society for all parameter values  above  ; when
 <  , the old gain from aging. The elderly are more likely to lose from an
ageing society when the publicly provided good exhibits strong crowding eﬀects
(high ) because ageing implies that the transfers from young to old have to
be shared among a larger number of elderly people. Put diﬀerently: If the
publicly provided good is closer to a public good, the beneﬁts of the good can
be shared among more elderly. As the size of the publicly provided good for the
elderly grows with an ageing society, the utility of each old person will increase.
Note also that the elderly population in smaller municipalities is more likely
to lose from the ageing process; a reduction in the relative size of the elderly
in municipality i shifts the  -curve downwards and increases the shaded area
(@ =@mi > 0). Due to ﬁscal competition the elderly cannot endlessly gain when
their majority increases.
In the following, we will derive the social planner’s solution and compare the
7outcome with the resource allocation and utilities derived by the two population
groups in a gerontocratic society.
4 Welfare Maximization
We consider the decision of a utilitarian social planner who maximizes welfare by
allocating the budget across municipalities and across the two types of publicly
provided goods. The social planner is not restricted to the budget constraints of
the individual municipalities but has to obey the aggregate budget constraint.
The social planner has no power over individual migration decisions. The mobile
young choose the municipality that grants the highest utility.9
The social planner maximizes the utilitarian welfare function
W = N1U1 + N2U2 + M1V1 + M2V2
by choosing the sizes of the publicly provided goods for the young Yi and for
the elderly Xi (i = 1;2). She has to take into account the budget constraint10
Y1 + Y2 + X1 + X2 = b  (N1 + N2 + M1 + M2):
Since there are economies of scale in the provision of the public services
( < 1) and the young are perfectly mobile, it is always optimal for the social
planner to provide the public services for the young in one municipality only.
The young will be concentrated in this municipality. Hence, the social planner’s
maximization problem boils down to
max
Y;X1;X2
W = NU + M1V1 + M2V2
s.t. Y + X1 + X2 = b  (N + M1 + M2):
The subscript on Y is dropped because the young reside in one community only.




















with i = 1;2 and  
1 
1  . Note that, due to  > 1=2, we always have
 > 1. The provision levels depend on the aggregate budget constraint and on
9Alternatively, we could assume that the social planner maximizes welfare for a given distri-
bution of the young population, i.e. half of the young population resides in each municipality
as it is the case in the symmetric Nash equilibrium. We discuss alternative speciﬁcations of
the social planner at the end of this section.
10Even though we have normalized the total population to unity, we explicitly keep the size
of the distinct population groups in the formula to facilitate interpretation.
8the relative share of the population groups. The provision level increases in the
size of a population group. Hence, with ageing, the social planner will provide
more of the publicly provided goods for the elderly and less for the young.
The more interesting question is how the utilities of the diﬀerent groups are
aﬀected by an ageing society. Using the notation for the share of the elderly s
and the distribution of the elderly m1;m2, we obtain the utility levels as
UW =
"
b  (1   s)
1 
1 










b  (s  mi)
1 
1 







for i = 1;2. As we have seen before, a decreasing young population will lead
to lower provision levels. However, the good also has to be shared among fewer
young inhabitants. For the elderly, the larger group size leads to higher provision
levels. The larger publicly provided good has to be shared among more users.
The net eﬀect of ageing on the utility of the young and the old is summarized
in
Proposition 2. (a) With welfare maximization, ageing leads to a lower pro-
vision of the publicly provided good for the young and a higher provision for
the elderly. (b) Ageing causes a decline of the utility of the young population,
whereas the eﬀect on the utility of the old population is ambiguous.
Proof. (a) Immediately follows from the derivatives of (13) and (14). (b)
Taking the derivative of UW with respect to s leads to
@UW
@s







) R 0: (17)
We evaluate the left-hand side at the maximum and show that it will never
exceed 0. Note that    =s < 0. Hence, the left-hand side will be maximized
for m1 = m2 = 1
2. As the expression grows in , it has to be evaluated at
 = 1, which implies  = 0. The left-hand side becomes zero at the maximum
and therefore @U
W















2) R 0: (18)
For very old societies (s ! 1), the derivative becomes negative. Hence, the
elderly lose from further ageing. For s = 1
2 and an equally distributed elderly
population m1 = m2 = 1
2, the derivative is strictly positive. Here, the elderly
gain from an ageing society.
As in the case of a gerontocracy, the elderly gain for a certain combination
of ageing (s) and crowding (). However, beyond a certain threshold they lose.
9In Section 5, we compare the impact of ageing on the resource allocation under
the social planner and the gerontocrat.
The above approach also allows us to analyze the consequences of hetero-
geneities in the ageing process. One of the main challenges for ageing societies is
the large heterogeneity among municipalities. Whereas one region is still fairly
young, the other already has a large number of elderly. How will diﬀerences in
the number of elderly aﬀect the provision of publicly provided goods? Without
loss of generality, let municipality 1 have more old inhabitants than municipality
2: m1 = 0:5 +  and m2 = 0:5    with  2 (0;0:5].
Proposition 3. A more unequal distribution of the elderly population reduces
the provision of the publicly provided good for the young and, therefore, the
utility of this group.
Proof. We rewrite (13) as
Y W =
b  (1   s)
(1   s) + s[(0:5 + ) + (0:5   )]
: (19)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  yields
@Y W
@
=  Y W s[(0:5 + ) 1   (0:5   ) 1]
(1   s) + s[(0:5 + ) + (0:5   )]
< 0: (20)






must also decline when heterogeneity increases.
This result suggests that the young population will suﬀer more from an
ageing society if the elderly population is more unequally distributed across
municipalities. An unequal distribution of the immobile old makes it more
expensive for the social planner to provide the publicly provided good for the
elderly. As a consequence, the provision of the publicly provided good for the
young is reduced. The impact of a more unequal population distribution on
the elderly is ambiguous. Depending on the size of the elderly population (s)
and on the degree of heterogeneity (), the elderly population may gain or lose
when the distribution becomes more unequal. The rising cost of provision may
be oﬀset by the changing group size.
Due to economies of scale, the provision of the publicly provided good for
the mobile young will only take place in one of the two municipalities under
welfare maximization. However, this result may not be in line with regional
policy which stipulates "equal living conditions" or "equal opportunities" in all
regions of a country. By requiring provision for the young in both municipalities
(e.g., assuming Y1 = Y2), the eﬀect of such policy can easily be integrated into
the current framework. The additional constraint forces the social planner to
lower the provision for both young and old. The qualitative eﬀects of ageing,
however, remain the same. For simplicity, we adhere to the ﬁrst-best welfare
solution in the subsequent section.
105 Comparison of the Gerontocracy and Welfare
Maximization
The two preceding sections have shown that, with both gerontocracy and welfare
maximization, ageing leads to a lower provision of publicly provided goods for
the young and a higher provision for the elderly. Dominance of the elderly in a
gerontocracy would suggest that the provision of the publicly provided good for
the young remains on an ineﬃciently low level in gerontocratic municipalities.
However, the exploitation of the young is limited as the municipalities have to
compete for the mobile young. This raises the question whether the provision
of the publicly provided good for the young remains on an ineﬃciently low level
in gerontocracies or whether, due to ﬁscal competition, the provision may even
exceed the welfare maximizing level beyond a certain level of ageing.
In order to compare the provision levels in the two scenarios (gerontocracy
and social planner), we rewrite the provision level for the young in a gerontocracy
[see Eq. (8)] as
Y G =
b  (1   s)
4
(21)
and in the case of a social planner [see Eq. (13)] as
Y W =
b  (1   s)






Note that the comparison is carried out for gerontocratic societies (s  1
2) and
for publicly provided goods with some crowding ( 2 [0:5;1]). Rearranging the
terms leads to






Proposition 4. The publicly provided good for the young is provided on an
ineﬃciently low level for ‘young’ gerontocracies but is provided on an ineﬃciently
large scale for ‘old’ gerontocracies.





right-hand side of (23) increases in s (@rhs
@s > 0). Diﬀerentiating the left-hand
side of (23) yields @lhs
@s = (1   s) 2  [ (   1)4 + (1   s)]. The left-hand
side of (23) has a maximum at s = 1  
 1
 4 < 1, as @
2lhs
@s2 < 0. We have
lhs > rhs at s = 0:5 and lhs < rhs at s = 1. Hence, there is one critical level
s0 for which s R s0 , Y G R Y W.
When the elderly gain the majority in a society, a gerontocracy will initially
use its power to exploit the young. The provision of the publicly provided good
for the young remains on an ineﬃciently low level. Accordingly, the provision of
11the publicly provided good for the elderly is excessively large. However, when
the society grows older, ﬁscal competition eventually forces the gerontocracy to
provide more of the publicly provided good than the social planner.
This results in the critical level s0, beyond which an ageing society provides
an excessive amount of publicly provided goods for the young. The variable s0
can be used to carry out some interesting comparative statics. Let
e  [4   (1   s0)]  (1   s0) 1   s

0  ((0:5 + ) + (0:5   )) (24)
where we have replaced m1 and m2 with 0:5 +  and 0:5   , respectively, to
analyze the impact of a more unequal distribution of the elderly population.
Diﬀerentiating (24) immediately yields @e
@s0 < 0 (see the Proof to Proposition 4)
and @e
@ < 0. Diﬀerentiating with respect to the crowding parameter  leads to
@e
@




f(0:5 + ) [ln(1   s0)   ln(s0)   ln(0:5 + )]+
+ (0:5   ) [ln(1   s0)   ln(s0)   ln(0:5   )]g
: (25)
Numeric evaluation of this expression shows that @e
@ > 0. Hence, we get the














The excessive provision of the publicly provided good for the young is reached
earlier, i.e. with a lower share of the elderly s, when the population is more un-
equally distributed across the municipalities () and when the publicly provided
good exhibits less crowding (lower ).
So far we have focused on a comparison of the provision levels. However,
since the provision level is dependent on the number of users, the utility levels
achieved by the population should be considered. We can immediately state
that the utility of the young will be higher in a gerontocracy if the gerontocracy
provides more publicly provided goods for the young than the social planner.
Note that the gerontocracies provide the publicly provided good in each munic-
ipality whereas the social planner concentrates her expenditures for the young
in one municipality. Hence, the larger publicly provided good has to be shared
among fewer young people in a gerontocracy. In this case, the young must be
better oﬀ in a gerontocracy. Even with a slightly smaller provision level in
gerontocracies, the young may gain due to the ﬁscal competition eﬀect. To ob-
tain the general condition for the young being better oﬀ in a gerontocracy, we








in a gerontocracy [see Eq. (10)] and
UW =
 
b  (1   s)
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with a social planner [see Eq. (15)]. The comparison of the utility of a young
person in a gerontocracy and in a welfare maximizing society then yields
UW R UG ,

22    (1   s)






This comparison has the same qualitative structure as Eq. (23), where the
provision quantities of the two scenarios are compared. Let  s denote the critical
share of the elderly where the utilities the young achieve are the same in a
gerontocracy and in a welfare maximizing society (UW = UG). As we have
22   4, we immediately get  s  s0. This implies that UG > UW occurs
’sooner’, i.e. at a lower s, than for the case when Y G > Y W. The young arrive
at ineﬃciently low utility levels in moderate gerontocracies. However, when
society grows older, the young even beneﬁt. Due to ﬁscal competition, their
utility exceeds the welfare maximizing level.
6 Conclusion
We have developed a simple framework that allows us to analyze the ﬁscal
competition of ageing municipalities. The ageing of a society will lead to shifts
in the provision of public services. When ageing advances, it is optimal from
a welfare maximizing point of view to gradually substitute publicly provided
goods aimed at the young population with publicly provided goods preferred by
the elderly population. This substitution process does not only depend on the
ageing itself but also on the degree of crowding and on the regional distribution
of the elderly population.
Once the elderly gain the majority in society, they use their power to reduce
the provision of the publicly provided good for the young to an ineﬃciently
low level. As our analysis has shown, the downscaling of the provision of the
publicly provided good proceeds even slower in a gerontocracy than in a welfare
maximizing society. The driving force behind this phenomenon is the ﬁscal
competition for the mobile young among the municipalities. When the share of
the elderly is suﬃciently large, the utility of the young is higher in gerontocracies
than in welfare maximizing societies. Ultimately, the gerontocracies will provide
even more of the publicly provided good for the young than the social planner.
Put diﬀerently: The threat of ageing towns is not so much the exploitation of the
young but rather the excessive incentives for making municipalities attractive
for the mobile young. The enormous investments in sports facilities and in
13family-friendly environments which currently occur in the rapidly ageing rural
areas in eastern Germany may already be telling examples of this trend.
To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst attempt to analyze the consequences
of ﬁscal competition in ageing societies. Our approach is admittedly simple to
highlight the main driving forces of this process. Many open questions remain
for future research. First, we have focused on the ageing process but a declin-
ing population size may also result from the ongoing demographic transition.
Second, generations may be linked by altruistic motives. The elderly may care
for the well-being of their children. Such intergenerational links may also create
barriers to mobility for the young, which aﬀects ﬁscal competition and may even
lead to path dependence in the population distribution. Third, the complexity
of municipal decision-making goes far beyond the simple provision of two types
of publicly provided goods. Alternative means of ﬁnancing through taxes may
change the provision levels of publicly provided goods. Municipalities do not
only compete for households but also for ﬁrms. Attracting new investments may
create jobs and generate a subsequent inﬂow of households. Finally, changes in
the size of publicly provided goods often entail considerable adjustment costs
that have to be taken into account.
A Appendix: Mixed strategy equilibrium
In the case of two gerontocracies, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium for
  1=2. However, when  < 1=2, only a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. In
the following, we derive the equilibrium properties of the gerontocratic solution
in detail.
The ﬁrst order condition for municipality i is (see Section 3):

















  1 = 0: (31)
In order to determine the reaction function, we diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order con-




























































Equation (32) gives the second-order condition. In equilibrium, we need
14Figure 2: The Pure Strategy Equilibrium
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The reaction function has a positive slope for Yi < Yj and a negative slope for
Yi > Yj (as long as the second-order condition is fulﬁlled). Figure 2 illustrates
the equilibrium in pure strategies.
There is a unique symmetric equilibrium with Yi = Yj = bN
4. So far, we have
neglected the possibility that the municipalities are worse oﬀ when competing for
the young. If a municipality has to spend more on the young than it receives via
the per capita grant, it will be better oﬀ by withdrawing from ﬁscal competition.
Hence, in equilibrium, the expenditures on the young must not exceed the grants
received for the young (bN
4  bN
2 ), which is the case for   1=2.
For  < 1=2, the participation constraints for the municipalities become
binding and, therefore, the reaction function exhibits a discontinuity (see Fig-
ure 3). For low provision levels in municipality j, muncipality i competes for
the young by providing a positive amount of the publicly provided good. How-
ever, when the provision in municipality j exceeds the threshold level ~ Yj, the
participation constraint becomes binding for municipality i and it reacts with
zero provision for the young. We ﬁrst determine the threshold ~ Yj and then show
that the provision of ~ Yj in one municipality and a randomization of provision
in the other municipality is an equilibrium.
The threshold for municipality i is reached when it spends as much on the
publicly provided good as it receives in grants for the young: b  Ni = Yi.
Substituting the equilibrium migration from (5) and solving for Yj yields








This expression determines all provisions of publicly provided goods (Yi;Yj)
where municipality i is indiﬀerent between providing Yi and nothing for the
young. In addition, the provision of Yi has to be a local optimum for municipality
i. Therefore, we substitute (36) into the ﬁrst-order condition (31) and obtain
Yi = (1 )bN and ~ Yj =  (1 )(1 ) bN. If municipality j plays ~ Yj,
municipality i is just indiﬀerent between Yi = (1   )  b  N and Yi = 0.
For an equilibrium, municipality i must choose the alternatives Yi = (1  
)  b  N with probability pH and Yi = 0 with probability 1   pH such that
municipality j ﬁnds it optimal to play ~ Yj. The expected utility of municipality
j amounts to
E [Uj(Yj)] =pH (b(Mj + Nj)   Yj) + (1   pH)(b(Mj + N)   Yj) =






+ (1   pH)bN   Yj: (37)
















  1 = 0: (38)














. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, municipality i chooses





and Yi = 0 with probability
1   pH. Municipality j (j 6= i) plays ~ Yj.
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